To develop:
To understand our security we must understand our adversary[^1]. More specifically we need sufficient evidence about relevant threats, in enough time, to allow for good, informed decisions.
Successful threat intelligence helps security teams to better understand previous, existing, and emerging threats; encouraging them to shift from reactive to proactive responses.
Identifying and profiling potential threats effectively leads to better detection, prevention, and remediation, because security teams can then put in place the most effective solutions for those particular threats.
This provides some guidance to examining threats in more detail
[TBC] Actuals vs Categories
We borrow from other threat assessments, for example the UK Military use the mnemonic COWARD:
Tactical, theatre, strategic levels
also recruitment, finance, training, resources, influence, effectiveness, serviceability, readiness, rehearsals, precedent
and our favourite servants what, when where who how and why)
For many this will be a defensive assessment, only considering Threat Actors ability to harm. For some this should include offense; in what ways can Threat Actors be harmed or at least diverted, decoyed, trapped, disabled, etc.
To break that down and extend it, consider:
Motive & Target: Why are they attacking? What assets are they targeting and why? What established relationships do they have with the target?
Location & Routes: Where are they based? In cyber space as well as geographical? What routes are available to them from there to our systems, considering their capabilities? What surfaces are exposed to them?
Opportunity: Circumstances that make certain attacks possible or easier to execute (e.g., Cryptographic downgrade attacks/ Staff handover on physical entry).
Intent: The intended outcomes of an attack and expected level of damage if successful. Include exploitation (e.g., to publicize a breach, sell information on black market).
Capability: The extent of the threat actor’s ability - sectioned into the following:
Technical Strength – Technical knowledge, skills, ability. (E.g., can the threat actor write zero-day attack scripts, or are they reliant on pre-existing scripts?)
Social Strength – non-technical areas of expertise (e.g., interpersonal skills used in social engineering).
Resources: Information, time, teams, tools etc. Consider:
Support – Are they sponsored by political, or government states with access to political/financial resources?
Limitations – Limitations in time and manpower then we can expect this to affect their stealth and persistence.
{width=”2.9055555555555554in”
height=”1.8229166666666667in”}Organisation: Flat, hierarchical,
holocratic, what combinations? How is it distributed? What positions
are important? Where does direction come from? What are good target
points?
{width=”4.74068460192476in”
height=”2.760751312335958in”}Order of Battle: How is group
organized when operating? What do they connect to? What do they use
(space, power, etc)
(Weapons) Equipment and Tools: Serviceability, Training, Range, Effectiveness, Targets, common employment, locations, identifying signatures
{width=”1.9680555555555554in”
height=”1.53125in”}TTPs: Training, Techniques, Processes: What
methods do we expect the threat actor to use. (E.g., phishing emails).
Integrated complex attacks, slow attacks, subtle or brute force, quick
drive bys or deliberate focused penetration?
Reserves: Who can support in what way? Other groups, protection, sympathisers: size, strength, location just as with main force. How long to access, spin up. Recruiting? Threatening, revenge, finance, ideology, persuasion, how long?
{width=”2.6527777777777777in”
height=”1.5451388888888888in”}Doctrine / Behaviour patterns –
characteristics and habits (e.g., What might a sophisticated
attacker’s bash history look like compared to a newbie ‘Script
Kiddie’), not just for individuals but groups; how do they form, work,
pass tasks around, etc.
Exposure – What traces do we expect the threat actor to leave behind? (e.g., a chain for communication between organised criminal group members)
…and of course do not limit yourself to the above, nor try and comprehensively study each. These are guidelines to help think around Threat Actors and help prepare for them.
Creating profiles or portraits of typical threat actors in your domain can help to create rapid security control profiles and response playbooks.
Proximity
Provides indicators and warnings and subjects to monitor for what.
Money: this may be an end in itself, but there is usually a purpose. Gambling, security, ‘high life’, sex, showing off, etc.
Reputation or notoriety
Curiosity & Hoarding: gaining long-term access to sensitive data
Revenge
Sabotage – attempting to steal business secrets to gain advantage on competitors, or denying service to competitor devices
To practice - or just for fun!
Hacktivism – to make a social or political point / encouraging political, ideological or social change
Ideological or ethical disagreement.
Know Your Enemy: Understanding Threat Actors | CSO Online
What Is A Threat Actor? | Cyber Threat Actors | Blog | Nexor
Creating a Threat Profile for Your Organization (giac.org)
1 Sun Tzu “Art of War” and pretty much every other classical book on conflict since