To develop
When it comes to ‘Detect’ we can look at what known attacks can be detected, and use rules-based monitors (such as Zabbix, or Security Onion, or a host of others) that monitor traffic and devices and look for particular patterns of behaviour that correspond to known attack patterns, and can raise alerts.
Other detecting tools include pattern of life monitors, that look for sudden changes in behaviour as likely symptoms of compromise. These can be useful where there are traffic streams that follow predictable patterns, at least in aggregate, such as an office that communicates using Outlook and writes documents using Word. They are less useful when the behaviour changes frequently and sporadically. Indeed they themselves can be a threat in particular circumstances. For example, a system that switches from peacekeeping to combat is likely to strongly change behaviour, and a pattern of life monitor raising alerts will be distracting at best, and debilitating at worst if it tries to shut down components that it believes have been compromised.
| We also intend to use ‘trip wires’, such as honeypot traps. These are, for example, devices or communication routes that are available but we do not use, and may be attractive to threat actors who are exploring systems and so sending data to devices and down routes that are normally dormant. Any traffic detected there can then alert us to their presence. |
Cyber security controls are broken down into technical controls to protect the software systems through gateways and authenticators, and administration controls to protect the people through training and procedures. These are then monitored to check they work, and we feed the outputs of that back into the security evaluation
